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Abstract
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both
the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a
strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that
differ from each other in their utilization of money and credit and their treatment of threats. It is
shown that there are natural upper and lower bounds to the monetary needs of an economy, but
even in the extreme structures the concept of “enough money” can be defined usefully, and for
large economies the games obtained from the lower and upper bounds have cores that approach the
same limit that is an efficient price system. The role of disequilibrium is then discussed.
JEL Classification: C71, C72, D53, E40
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a non-technical sketch of a game theoretic approach to the theory of money and
financial institutions developing the thesis that both the institutional aspects of the financial system
and the mathematical analytics are needed to provide an adequate understanding of the role of
finance in economic theory. The game theoretic details are given in a series of publications, alone
or with various joint authors over the last fifty years.
No theorems are given here, but the models, concepts and results are stressed. In particular, the
appropriate level of abstraction is stressed and interpreted in game theoretic terms. The level of
abstraction is highly dependent on the question at hand. Too high a level of abstraction may
guarantee the question cannot be answered as key details have been omitted. Too low a level of
abstraction leaves one with a morass of detail that may easily block analysis. The selection of the
right level of abstraction still is somewhat of an art form, not unlike the provision of context given
by a sensitive historian.
The theory of games provides the methods for strategic analysis. The major roles of finance in the
economy are evaluative and strategic, thus game theory methods are natural to its study. Finance,
together with markets, provides the evaluation and control mechanisms needed to control and run a
complex economy. The role of finance is to control the dynamics of an economy. In equilibrium its
role can easily be unseen as it disappears as a paper or symbolic shadow of the physical production
and consumption processes it guides.
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2. PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS OF A FORMAL GAME
Much of formal game theory utilizes one of three forms of description as the primitive concept
accepted from which the formal economic model is developed. The three forms are: The extensive
form of the game; the strategic form and the coalitional form. Each can be utilized without
reference to the other, but the level of abstraction clearly flows in one direction.
The extensive form is clearly process oriented and essentially institutional. All moves and
information conditions are spelled out. The rules of the game are given in detail. It is a matter of a
modeling decision as to whether to include items such as verbal statements as part of the formal
moves of the game. Usually they are excluded because it is extremely difficult to reduce them to
formal mathematics, but in a limited way it can be done.
The strategic form can be derived from the extensive form by utilizing the construction of a set of
strategies derived from the extensive form. The game theoretic concept of a strategy is a complete
book of instructions that could be given by a player to a proxy player to play on his behalf. The
instructions must cover every contingency feasible in the game. Even a casual examination of the
extensive form of a game as simple as tic-tac-toe or Checkers has billions of strategies. In
elementary expositions of game theory the 2 × 2 matrix game is often utilized. The hyperinflation
of the number of strategies is glossed over in the exploration of the non-cooperative equilibria of
the game in strategic form. In actual institutions, consultation, delegation and aggregation are used
to execute strategies.
The conceptual leap from the extensive form to the strategic form is achieved in one bound having
to apply no more than logic. No extra considerations of modeling are called for. This is not so when
we proceed from the strategic representation of a game to the coalitional representation. In
multilateral bargaining and diplomatic negotiations the coalitional form is a natural starting place.
We ask the straightforward question “What can a coalition of size S achieve if it refuses to
cooperate? “ Unfortunately this question is not fully formulated. It does not specify what we expect
the influence to be of the other set of N − S participants. They could ignore S, or could carry out
sanctions or threats that are of significance to S’s welfare. This is the well known problem of
specifying the threat structure when describing a game in coalitional form. The solution lies far less
in the mathematics than in the perceptive modeling of the problem at hand. Those who are more
interested in the mathematics of solutions to games in coalitional form than in the mapping from
the physical phenomenon to the coalitional representation (often referred to as the characteristic
function) accept the coalitional form as a primitive concept without argument or concern as to
where it came from.
The progression to higher degrees of abstraction as we proceed from the extensive form to the
strategic form and then to the coalitional form can be verified when it is observed that there is a
one-to-many mapping from the coalitional form to the strategic form and from the strategic form to
the extensive form, but not vice-versa.
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3. EXCHANGE MODELS AND THE LEVEL OF ABSTRACTION
A prime concern here is to compare the general equilibrium model of economic exchange with
game theoretic approaches to the same problems. Two basic game theoretic approaches are
adopted. They are strategic market games based on the strategic form and solved utilizing the
noncooperative equilibrium and market games based on the coalitional form and solved primarily
for the core of the game in coalitional form.
Without going into detail, some basic observations can be made concerning the relationship among
market games, modified market games, strategic market games and the competitive equilibrium
exchange economy.
The mathematical model of the Walrasian economy was a masterpiece of parsimony, but the
existence proof of an efficient price system was obtained at the cost of providing a model that could
not be played as an experimental game without providing considerable extra detail to convert it into
a fully defined process model. The omission of price formation was an abstraction that was
sufficient for an existence proof but gave an essentially dynamic and strategic process an
appearance of timelessness. The general equilibrium system is presented as a model with a high
level of abstraction, well defined for the examination of some of its static properties, but not
adequately defined for the study of process or the role of information. In game theoretic terms, the
model presented is an incompletely formulated game in strategic form. It is as though all time has
been collapsed into a single move.
The two game theoretic approaches to modeling a multi-person economy both provide completely
well defined games. The strategic market game utilizes the extensive or strategic form and is
considerably more institutional than the general equilibrium model. It offers details concerning
price formation. An immediate criticism that can be leveled against it is that going down to the
level of detail required to specify price mechanisms destroys the generality of the model and
produces a welter of special cases from which little of general interest can be deduced. This
however, may be a fact of life whose influence is modified when competition is sufficiently large.
Market games in contrast with strategic market games are at a higher level of abstraction than the
general equilibrium system. They utilize the coalitional form as the given or primitive structure.
Market games have been studied in two forms, usually referred to as side-payment (SP) and no
side-payment games (NSP). The distinction can most easily seen in terms of the existence or nonexistence of a special monetary commodity we can call Marshallian money, i.e., a special extra
commodity that enters the preferences of all individuals as a linear separable term in their utility
functions. Another way of expressing this is that the utility functions of all individuals are quasiconcave. If an economy has enough Marshallian money the individuals can jointly maximize their
welfare and adjust their division of proceeds on a planar Pareto optimal surface.
The NSP game has no magic transferable utility, but in a game theoretic model of an exchange
economy with many small agents it is as if the unit of account serves as a transferable utility for
each individual locally. To a small individual the unit of account acts as though he has perfect
liquidity, but for the system as a whole the unit of account nets to zero. The game theoretic
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literature on the λ-transfer provides the mathematical basis for the link between individual liquidity
and global illiquidity (Shubik, 1984).
4. THE SOLUTIONS ADOPTED
The different models employ different solution concepts. In essence, a formal game is described by
its rules. These in turn enable the investigator to describe the complete set of outcomes from all
plays of the game (sometimes referred to in the study of stochastic processes as the complete state
space). A solution is nothing more than some device for selecting a subset of outcomes from the
total set of outcomes. A solution designed to provide a specific prediction will select a single
outcome.
4.1. The Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium solution stresses individual optimization where each agent acts given
all market prices. How these prices are formed is dealt with by the assumption of rational
expectations where the implicit assumption is that the expectations of all individuals are mutually
consistent. As is well known, (Debreu, 1959) generically the competitive equilibrium solution is a
finite point set, i.e., the solution is not unique. There can be many equilibria each with different
implications concerning the distribution of wealth in exchange. If the general equilibrium model as
formulated by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959) is adhered to, the conditions for the
uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium pose a mathematically difficult problem that has not yet
been resolved. However if the problem is enlarged and bankruptcy conditions are considered there
is a straightforward unique solution (see Qin and Shubik 2006).
The general equilibrium system is usually presented as stressing the virtues of competition. Yet this
is not correctly reflected in the mathematics unless a continuum of agents is considered or a
limiting process that reflects “many agents” is defined. The proof presented by Debreu in his
otherwise precise book holds true for n = 1, where n is the number of agents. This is hardly a
description of competition.
4.2. Strategic Market Games
Strategic market games provide full process models. Phrased differently, any strategic market game
is sufficiently specified that it is possible to program a playable game that can be used for
experimentation. Unfortunately, the need to be specific about items such as price formation opens
the model builder up to a plethora of special cases. How can we deal with the overwhelming
number of cases that appear to exist when we look at the institutional realities? There are ways to
do so. We may attempt to define minimal institutions and we can also consider models that in some
appropriate way reflect upper and lower bounds on relevant processes.
The concept of minimal institution can be made rigorous in terms of game theory modeling. An
illustration serves to indicate how. The simplest price formation mechanism is one where some
individuals bid quantities of money and others simultaneously offer quantities of some goods. The
strategic and extensive form of the game can be made to coincide. There is only one information set
per player and a move and a strategy coincide (Shubik, 1972). It is shown elsewhere that there are
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three elementary mechanisms for forming price. The first is known as the sell-all market, where all
individuals are required to put up all of their physical assets for sale. This is a tax collector’s dream,
evaluating all wealth at market. The agents bid amounts of money in order to buy and they receive
the income from their sales later (Shapley and Shubik, 1977). In any market the move of an
individual is one-dimensional, consisting of a bid. The second market is the buy-sell market, where
quantities of the good are offered for sale and quantities of money are bid to buy all goods for sale
(Dubey and Shubik, 1978). The third model is the simultaneous move double auction. Here the
strategy of each individual has four dimensions in each market. She can name a personal price and
quantity at which she is willing to sell and similarly a price and quantity to buy.
A further market model has been developed by Sorin (1996) that captures the possibility that each
individual issues his own currency. It can be interpreted in terms of international trade or an
economy where “everyone is a banker. “ The integrating factor in the model is that as soon as all
individuals have bid their own currencies a centralized efficient clearing house calculates the
exchange rate required to balance all books and informs all so that the goods shipped to each bidder
reflect the bidder’s claims accurately by being adjusted for the correct exchange rates. In actuality,
incomplete information and imperfect reputation make this ideal market hard to obtain.
In each model the solution utilized is the noncooperative equilibrium (Nash, 1951). Because all of
the models are “one-shot games “ where the strategic form supplies the same information as the
extensive form game there are no qualifications about the nature of a noncooperative equilibrium,
and although the noncooperative equilibria are not unique they generically form a point set. This
does not hold once the extensive and strategic forms differ. Concepts such as the perfect
equilibrium (Selten, 1975) are required to distinguish among those equilibria which do or do not
reflect threats and do or do not make use of history. Even the simple definition of equilibrium
manifests some difficulties (Shubik, 1996).
4.3. Market Games
There are many solution concepts associated with a game in coalitional form. The characteristic
function itself can be regarded as a “presolution,” in the sense that it already reflects how the
modeler has handled the threats that must be reflected in the coalitional form.
The various cooperative solutions that have been suggested each reflect a particular normative
property. In particular, the comments here are confined to two solutions. They are the core and the
value of a game. The term imputation is used to describe the vector of payoffs indicating the
amounts that each individual obtains at any outcome from an n-person game. The definition of the
core as a solution is the set of imputations that are not dominated by each other or any other
imputations. Essentially they are the outcomes that no coalition has the power to argue about by
threatening not to cooperate by going into business by itself. There is a large literature dating even
from pre-game theory, starting with Edgeworth (1881), showing that the competitive equilibria lie
within the core and that under the appropriate conditions a limiting process can be established that
shows the convergence of the core to the competitive equilibria (Edgeworth, 1881; Shubik, 1959;
Scarf, 1973 and others).
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The value of a game, in various forms, may be attributed to Nash (1953), Shapley (1953) and
Harsanyi (1959). It attaches a single evaluation or a finite point set of valuations to any game. The
value is defined by a set of axioms. From which, for a sidpayment game an explicit formula for any
game can be deduced. In essence, each individual obtains his combinatoric marginal value
productivity; i.e., imagine that an individual enters every feasible coalition of size s in every one of
the orderings feasible. We calculate the a priori probabilities of each of these events and credit the
individual with the overall expected productive contribution of the individual being measured.
5. RESULTS FROM GAME THEORY RELATING TO COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
One of the motivations in the utilization of market games was to explore the limiting features of
different solutions and to see if they offered different insights into the concept of competitive
equilibrium. The conventional properties from welfare theory are that the CE is efficient and that if
the appropriate price system is given it provides a signal that permits individual decentralized
optimization. The core adds the feature of the CE being unchallenged by any coalitions in a
cooperative game. The convergence of the value, under the appropriate conditions to the CE
provides justification for the consideration of fair division axioms. The lack of uniqueness of the
CEs and the no-sidepayment value raise questions concerning whether the society outside of the
economy selects among the non-unique welfare weightings.
Missing from the list of solutions above, who in the limit can be related to the competitive
equilibrium is the Cournot model of competition. Yet a glance at the original work of Cournot
(1838) clearly shows a well defined precursor to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium together
with an example of the convergence of the noncooperative equilibrium under replication.
Having utilized cooperative game theory to provide a “shopping list “ of mass market properties
for the price system approached via cooperative games, a reasonable question to ask was why is the
Cournot model not on the list? In 1970 I addressed the question as to why we did not have a closed
economy model that included the Cournot market structure and linked it to general equilibrium,
much in the same way that Cournot had already done for the open model.
Unlike the cooperative models that were in coalitional form and did not take price as a primitive
concept, the Cournot model had to be in strategic form with an explicit mechanism for price
formation.
The critical distinction between what Cournot had done and what needed to be done was that the
open, or partial equilibrium model had to be embedded in a closed general equilibrium framework.
This required facing up to a problem involving counting the numbers of degrees of freedom in the
strategy sets of the individuals in the game being built. The approach adopted was to try to build an
extremely simple symmetric game preserving the intrinsic symmetries of all strategy sets. The idea
was to consider an economy with n agents, each one being a monopolist, and then replicating the
number of agents in each type utilizing the simplest method of price mechanism.
On the first attempt to try to construct an intrinsically symmetric game, a difficulty was
encountered. If each individual has only one good and price is formed by the amount of one good
chasing another, then there are only n − 1 prices to be formed. Unless all individuals have the
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relatively complicated strategy of bidding in all pairs of markets or unless an extra commodity (real
or virtual) is introduced that is used as a means of payment for all others one cannot maintain the
symmetry of the strategy sets (see Shubik and Smith, 2006; Smith and Shubik, 2005). I chose to
endow all individuals with an n + 1st commodity to be used a means of payment at n market posts
where one of the n commodities could be exchanged directly for the n + 1st commodity. This game
preserved the symmetry that would have been lost had a commodity belonging to a single type been
selected as a money. The nature of the price formation mechanism of the game naturally introduced
cash-flow constraints. In short, it provided a simple model for a closed simple Cournot market with
trade intermediated by markets run with money. In this first version the money was a physically
undistinguished commodity (Shubik, 1972; Shapley and Shubik, 1977; Shapley, 1976). In
subsequent models many different properties of the monetary commodity have been considered
(see for example Shubik and Tsomocos, 2002). These appear in the preference conditions, the
initial conditions, the methods of creation and destruction and rules of operation and default.
With the appearance of cash flow constraints due to the logic of cash payment in price formation, it
is natural that with a commodity money prices are not homogeneous of order zero and that the
concept of “enough money “ can be well-defined. If there is not enough money the shadow price of
the constraint will appear in addition to the price of the money as a commodity. This additional
price can be diminished by the explicit introduction of a credit structure with the appropriate
instruments. Thus an array of banking and credit arrangements can be modeled that depend on the
structure of the markets and society.
5.1. Enough Money, Sidepayment and No-Sidepayment Games
It is of some interest to observe that the condition that there is enough Marshallian money in a sellall economy is precisely the condition required to convert an NSP market game into an SP market
game. As the amount of “trading utiles “ (or an ideal good that enters all utility functions as a linear
term) is increased the Pareto surface (in payoff space) moves outward and a planar segment is
progressively enlarged. As this is happening the initial no-trade position is also moving out.
Projections from this position define the individually rational segment of the Pareto surface. The
point at which the individually rational segment of the Pareto surface is completely planar is the
point at which there is enough money or perfect liquidity (see also Dubey and Neyman, 1984).
5.2. An Aside on Modeling, Mathematics and Uniqueness
A key challenge in economic theorizing is the appreciation of the tradeoff between mathematical
tractability and the realism and relevance of the model to be analyzed. Sometimes, by adding extra
features to a model one makes the analysis far simpler; sometimes the reverse is true. In particular
it is noted here that the addition of bankruptcy or default conditions to a specific strategic market
game can be utilized to select a unique equilibrium point with the extra properties that it is the
unique minimal cash flow equilibrium, if all solutions are normalized so that each is deemed to
have the same initial wealth. The default conditions and bankruptcy laws of a society are part of the
legal-socio-political context and are not merely determined by pure economics. In an n-person
game model these extra conditions can be mathematized as n extra constraints on the optimization
and it can be shown (Qin and Shubik, 2005) that this is sufficient or the selection of a unique
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equilibrium that requires the minimal use of cash, i.e., it minimizes the need for a trust-substitute in
trade.
The uniqueness conditions posed for the pure exchange model of general equilibrium are far harder
to study than the enlarged problem and may be less realistic and relevant than the institutionally
richer problem; even though they offer a difficult and challenging problem to the pure
mathematician.
6. THE RECONCILIATION OF MARKET GAMES AND STRATEGIC MARKET GAMES
Market games have been studied at a level of abstraction higher than that of general equilibrium.
Process does not appear in the mathematical formulation. All that matters in the analysis is the
valuation of the payoffs to all coalitions. Strategic market games, in contrast are not as abstract as
the general equilibrium models. The rules of the game can be interpreted as defining elemental
institutions. They are the carriers of process. Under certain circumstances it can be shown that the
details about the institutions do not matter. Dubey, MasColell and Shubik (1980) were able to show
that for a large number of agents a large class of mechanisms will guide the system to the same set
of outcomes. When numbers are few, mechanisms clearly matter.
A reasonable question to ask is can there be a way to link market games with strategic market
games, yet nevertheless preserving a high level of abstraction and generality in the new class of
games being created. Qin, Shapley and Shimomura (2006) considered a modified market game
where an added condition in the form of a “law of one price “ is imposed as a condition requiring
that all transfers of wealth must pass through a market with a price. However in doing so they
evaluated the coalitional form of the resultant game by assuming (as did Edgeworth) that a
coalition S is independent of the coalition N − S. This assumption, empirically may be quite good
when N − S is large and S is small, has the effect of suppressing the possibility that the actions of
N − S could threaten or otherwise influence the welfare of S via the interlinkage of the markets. It
is suspect when N − S and S are roughly the same size. It can be dispensed with by linking certain
strategic market games directly with associated market games. In other words the market game is
derived directly from the strategic market game thereby linking the strategic and coalitional forms.
The way to forge a useful connection between market games and strategic market games involves
an admixture of both institutional and mathematical considerations. The direct connection of the
coalitional form to a strategic form of a game involves considerable specification and can be
regarded as somewhat special and institutional. However by selecting two different ways to achieve
this goal, where the two ways can be interpreted as representing, in an appropriate sense, upper and
lower bounds, this can be done. Given that it is done, a further step remains. This involves showing
that the lower and upper bounding characteristic functions have cores that approach the same limit
as the number of agents becomes large.1
The basic argument is that these upper and lower bounds have a natural interpretation in a society’s
need for money or a trust substitute. The lower bound is an economy that requires no money. This
is implicitly reflected in the complete irrelevance of cash flow constraints to the general
1

This involves obtaining two sequences of characteristic functions depending on the number of agents and solving the
sequence of games for their cores.
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equilibrium model. The upper bound is an economy where all wealth has to be monetized every
period. This is the sell-all model. In terms of cash requirements every other economy lies in
between these two bounds. The more complicated and realistic price mechanisms require extensive
form representation by a game tree of many plies and their reduction to strategic form produces
games with enormous strategy sets. These reflect the institutional detail. In theory, any of the
myriads of lengthy extensive forms required to model the variety of institutional forms that exist in
any economy can be specified. In practice, in order to do so a deep ad hoc study of the specific
institution at hand is called for. The mere knowledge that this extensive form can be reduced to a
strategic form tells us little more than it is a well defined strategic market game whose cash flow
requirements lie between the lower and upper bounds already noted.
At this stage of our knowledge of institutional dynamics, possibly the best model and solution
concept to be utilized in the study of economic dynamics, is an institutional study bolstered with a
well written historical narrative, supplemented with whatever quantifiable statistics can be
produced and supported analytically by the type of modeling found in operations research or game
theoretic industrial organization.
The above observations could be interpreted almost as a counsel of despair saying that everything
is an institutional special case. This is not so. The details and use of the model depend on the
questions being asked. The understanding of the specific dynamics of the steel industry in order to
run a profitable firm requires knowing many detailed facts about the steel industry. If the question
concerns how much financial control the financial system has on the steel industry far less detail is
called for.
A purpose of this work is to understand the control and perception roles of the financial institutions
in a modern economy. The goal here is to convey an understanding without being trapped in the
many technical and mathematical details required to illustrate the relationship between competition
and financial control. The key point being made is that financial control comes through an ability to
manipulate cash flow constraints. This ability is limited by a host of institutional, socio
psychological and political conditions. The understanding requires both institutional and
mathematical features. The structure of the cash flow constraints is heavily determined by
institutional factors. The control of the constraints calls for perception and purpose in guidance and
action on the constraints.
The theory offered here provides the next critical step that was not given by general equilibrium
theory. It shows where and how money and financial institutions fit as a control mechanism over a
process oriented economy. It also shows that as the number of competitors becomes large the ideal
of a general equilibrium system can be established by considering either the core of a market game
or the noncooperative equilibria of a strategic market game. In fact, many parts of most economies
do not approach the limit but remain oligopolistic and for them specific institutional forms matter
considerably. However the economic models which require no financing or the most financing are
mathematically far simpler than the intermediate models, if it is feasible to show that they each
achieve the same equilibrium limits, this tells us that the overall structure of the static properties of
the general equilibrium system can be extended to economies with a financial control mechanism,
but the tightness of the control depends on numbers and institutions. When numbers are large,
institutions matter less.
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7. OBSERVATIONS ON UNCERTAINTY AND TIME
The discussion above has hardly touched upon uncertainty and multistage models. Yet it is well
known that much of modern finance deals with incomplete markets where the presence of
uncertainty through time plays a critical role. An excellent summary of the state of investigation of
economies with incomplete markets has been provided by McGill and Quinzi (1996). The essence
of modern finance is how to design instruments and institutions to optimize the allocation of funds
across future uncertain states. The work discussed here is complementary with both the body of
economic theory of incomplete markets and the growing literature applying stochastic processes to
practical problems in finance such as the pricing of options. The former may deal with an overall
closed economic system but primarily stresses equilibrium and hardly deals with process and
institutions; the latter deals almost exclusively with partial equilibrium phenomena or with the
investigation of dynamics in highly specific models such as those based on studies of mass data
from the New York or London stock exchanges (Farmer et al., 2005). The critical argument here is
that conceptually the understanding of the role of money involves the appreciation of trust,
evaluation and perception. Although they almost always do involve exogenous uncertainty, the
logic of trade is such that endogenous uncertainty is sufficient to require the existence of monetary,
financial, market and contractual enforcement mechanisms for any economy. An old American
quip: “In God we trust, all others pay cash,” offers a succinct summary.
Human memory is fragile and multistage trade, even without exogenous uncertainty, requires
contractual instruments that are enforced by the society. Even if all individuals are impeccably
honest, if their memories are not perfect, records are called for. The importance of accounting is
often overlooked in economic theorizing. Without its development modern economies would not be
feasible. Little items such as the abandoning of Roman for Arabic numerals totally changed the
operational usefulness of business accounting (Pacioli, 1498; Shubik, 1995).
8. AN ASIDE ON THE COMBINATORICS OF SEARCH AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY
OF MONETARY TRADE
There is a substantial literature both in economic anthropology dealing with early monetary
phenomena (see for example Einzig, 1944) and in the economic combinatorics of pre-market trade,
starting at least as early as Jevons’ (1875) discussion of the failure of the double coincidence of
wants. This literature includes Starr (1975), Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), Bak, Norrelykke and
Shubik (1999) and many others. It presents interesting insights into the combinatorics of search,
bargaining and trade and possibly offers some interesting analogies with anthropological
observations. It is a subfield of mathematical, experimental, socio-psychological and
anthropological interest, but if anything, it illustrates the probability that there were many ways and
many reasons for the emergence of money, credit and the other mechanisms of monetary control.
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9. THE MATHEMATICS OF ECONOMIC STATICS AND FINANCIAL DYNAMICS
9.1. Equilibrium Economics
The predominant mode of analysis in the study of the overall price system has been devoted to the
study of equilibrium. Mathematically, the problems are cast as a set of equations where the
optimization of each individual is subject to a single constraint that amounts to “balancing the
books at the end of time.”
From a game theoretic point of view the general equilibrium system is presented in strategic form.
All of time is collapsed into a single move. From the viewpoint of modeling the economy it is as
though the economy had achieved the utopian state of Saint Thomas More. There is no need for
money or financial instruments in Utopia or in the general equilibrium economy.
Even were we to get no more concrete than the abstract optimization problem posed by a price
guided production and consumption economy, as is evinced by the work of Scarf (1973) the
computational problems involved in calculating the equilibrium prices are considerable.
There is a considerable literature on economic dynamics ranging from the careful mathematical
structures of Ramsay (1928) and von Neumann (1937, 1945) to the work on business cycles and to
the mathematical dynamic models as formulated by Grandmont (1987) and others.
9.2. Disequilibrium Finance
In the modeling of the financial system that controls the economy, cash flow constraints play an
important role. An economy with a financial control system imposed over the real assets manifests
its control structure in a mass of cash flow constraints. The manifestation of these constraints
depends directly and indirectly on the credit structure. An economy without credit, with a fixed
transactions technology and commodity money such as gold can only change its money supply via
gold-mining or importation or exportation or it can stretch its supply by changes in the velocity. It
has no central bank or commercial banks. The money-lenders are capitalists with gold to lend.
In contrast, a system with a government fiscal authority, a central bank and commercial banks has
the ability to change the money supply. Mathematically financial control amounts to being able to
manipulate the effectiveness of cash flow constraints. This can be illustrated as follows. Consider
an economy where individuals are required to trade using cash or bank money. If it is in
competitive equilibrium all cash flow constraints are met. Now suppose that the economy is
perturbed by a change in tastes, endowments or the possibility of the introduction of a new product
with an uncertain effective demand. The projected money demand and cash flow constraints will be
changed. Some constraints will become binding, such as those in the industry contemplating the
production of the new product. Other constraints may become slack such as those in an industry
whose demand has diminished due to a change in tastes.
Slack constraints may offer the opportunity for money lending with cash flowing from the
depressed area to the growing part of the economy. This may not be enough, but the ability of the
banking system consisting of the commercial banks and central bank to create more money enables
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them to relax selectively the constraints on the system. The selection of which restraints to relax
becomes a matter of investment judgment. The banking system, government and private holders of
capital are all in the position to evaluate which constraints they choose to relax. The task of the
financial system is not merely to supply the trust-substitute pills to the economy to relax the cash
flow constraints, but to allocate funds among competing constraints. In order to do so it must serve
as a perception and financial decision device over the economy.
The dynamics that triggers the actions of the financial systems comes from many sources. It is
consistent with scenarios such as that sketched by Schumpeter (1911, 1961); the large literature on
business cycles (see Minsky, 1987) or in more mathematical form has been suggested in a shift in
expectations caused by exogenous events such as sunspots (see Cass and Shell 1983).
9.3. Where Does Macro-economics Fit into This Scheme?
Economic thought in the past century has been favored with the presence of many great macroeconomic practitioners. Keynes is arguably the most distinguished, and an individual such as Tobin
is a worthy successor. In spite of the brilliance of these individuals there has been a tension
between the micro-economic theorists and the macro-economic practitioners, whether they call
themselves theorists or not. The two sets of individuals operate at different levels of abstraction.
The nature of macro-economic dynamics demands an ad hoc approach. Policy advice and power
are interlinked. The topic under examination consists of the relatively ephemeral institutions of
today, how they are changing and how they can be controlled. The deeper invariants of the system
are of academic interest to the good macro-economist who should be perfectly happy to use a
temporary construct such as the Philips curve or any other phenomenon that has the decency to
have a half-life of at least five years.
Keynes was possibly the most distinguished applied economist and advocate of all times. He,
possibly deliberately, gave up a great career as a deep formal economic theorist to pursue the
economic aspects of the political and social goals of his time. Even today the tug between the
socially important immediate needs of a society and the longer term development of solid economic
theory is enormous. The need for good applied economic advice to navigate the quick sands of
political, institutional and technological change here and now calls for great minds. But advocacy
for today’s institutional fix and the development of an economic theory based on the invariant
properties behind an economic science are not the same. It is not a matter of virtue versus vice.
They serve different social functions.
10. THE LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
It has been noted that the financial system appears to be far more volatile than the economic
system, in general. So it should be. It has the role of the sensory, guiding and control mechanism of
the economy. Like the control mechanism of the human body it is small relative to the mass it
controls. Furthermore, although its energy consumption is small relative to the economy as a
whole, it is nevertheless substantial and markets, brokers and trading mechanisms run on margins
far smaller than the firms in the physical economy. Because of the enormous volume, even with
low margins the rewards of finance can be considerable. But because of the low margins, a slight
change in costs, due to changes in technology, taxes, law or other factors, can cause a substantial
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swing from one transactions method or financing technique to another. In manufacturing a swing of
a few basis points rarely makes much difference to a decision, in a transaction technology it does.
A basic property of a system designed to perceive and control is that its timing constants will be far
shorter than those of the body or organization it is designed to control. Flexibility and speed are
critical to its function. Yet it is here that the clash between the viewpoints of finance and economics
can lead to a mismodeling of the critical factors of function. The economist seeking to explore and
analyze equilibrium properties may easily assign zero costs to the transactions technology. In doing
so it becomes easy to obtain results that show enormous indeterminacy in methods of financing
(Geanakoplos and MasCollel, 1989). But the difference between low transactions costs and no
transactions cost is the difference between being able to appreciate the role of finance in the
economy and obliterating its key features. As soon as a cost is attached to the operation of every
process the excess of degrees of freedom in the finance guided economy is removed. How to
estimate the actual costs is an empirical and conceptual problem of considerable size as many of the
costs involve network phenomena and zones of increasing returns to scale, caused by stochastic
elements, (Arthur, 1989) set-up costs and other phenomena.
11. ON MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Many years ago, when first attempting to study economic dynamics, I coined the phrase
“Mathematical Institutional Economics” (Shubik, 1959). My reason for utilizing this phrase is that I
was trying to extend results on static non-cooperative equilibrium oligopoly studies based on
Cournot, Edgeworth and Bertrand to multistage models of oligopolistic competition. In trying to do
so, I found myself buried in a mountain of special cases, all of which appeared to be relevant to
some particular situation. At that time I did not fully appreciate that the apparent conflict between
the detailed micro-economic study of economic institutions and abstract economic theory did not
need to be a conflict. Economics, as it is currently taught has not faced up to the type of libraries
and compendia of models accepted by operations researchers applying inventory theory. Any form
of economic dynamics, be it the design of an inventory policy for a supermarket or a prediction of
the development of the steel industry over the next two or five years calls for much ad hoc detail. A
brief contemplation of the curse of dimensions in economic analysis makes this evident. When an
actual economic institution is examined any group of competent practitioners can list hundreds of
different variables or other factors which bear some relevance to the institution and its motion
through time. Even with large scale simulation capabilities, a selection of the subset of variables
most appropriate to the questions at hand is called for.
The transactions technology of any society is a matter of institutional fact, replete with hosts of
special cases and details. Abstractly the structure emerges as a set of constraints on a multi-agent
optimization problem. The evaluation of the importance of the constraints is essentially the task of
the entrepreneurs, financiers and government of the society. The adjustment of these constraints
amounts to a game primarily among the entrepreneurs, financiers and government.
The appropriate appreciation of institutional fact is a necessary condition that precedes answering
applied questions about the economy. The mere knowledge of the institutions is not enough. If
analytical thought is to be given to policy the appropriate mathematical models from theory that
exists at a higher level of abstraction must be hand-tailored to fit close enough to the facts to make
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their mathematical analysis relevant and useful. In actuality, few theorists and few practitioners are
psychologically able to bridge the gap between over-abstraction and practice.
12. FINANCIAL DYNAMICS AND NEVER ENOUGH MONEY
It has been noted above in Section 9.2, that a rigorous mathematical definition can be given to the
concept of enough money when the equilibrium conditions are being studied. As has already been
noted, there is enough money, well distributed if the shadow prices of all cash flow constraints is
zero. Furthermore, a game theoretic interpretation can be given that links a no-sidepayment game
with a sidepayment game via an ideal or Marshallian money. The tidy micro-economic package of
economic equilibrium can accept the financial structure as an unneeded icing on the cake inasmuch
as the equilibrium conditions are precisely the conditions that bring about the minimal need and
utilization of the financial structure.
In disequilibrium there is almost always never enough money. The constraints are either slack or
binding and the binding constraints are where perceived growth is being constrained.
13. IS THERE AN IDEAL CURRENCY AND DOES IT MATTER?
The Grail is in the seeking and not the cup.
In human striving the search for the Holy Grail provides much motivation. The mystic cup, the
fountain of youth or the shining city are always luring us over the horizon. So it is with the search
for the ideal currency.
The ideal currency would be the Marshallian money in sufficient supply that can convert a no-sidepayment game into a side-payment game. It would provide perfect liquidity. In this imperfect world
over several thousand years the predominant commodity of choice that comes close has been gold.
But it has many drawbacks including high costs of extraction and erratic and insufficient supplies.
Even more perfect than gold would be a Utopian world where all individuals trusted each other
completely, each had an impeccable reputation and all had perfectly accurate memories. Even in
this world, unlike in the fantasies of Saint Thomas More, good recordkeeping would facilitate fair
play.
As more stable societies have evolved, since the late 17th century, the trend has been towards a
paper or purely abstract money. It is part of an evolutionary process which apparently heads
towards a limit point of Utopian perfection but never attains it. Transactions costs are part of
physical reality and even a paper money or cipher money and credit system requires the existence
and costs of bookkeeping, contract law, default laws and the enforcement of the courts.
Currently there are of the order of 200 national currencies in existence and the move towards a
single international currency is on the way. Barring major catastrophe a multi-layered organization
of central banks with an empowered world central bank and a single major international currency is
to be expected eventually. Ricardo (1817) writing at a time when the transactions and
transportation economy was both considerably slower and smaller than today opted for gold as a
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currency essentially because he viewed the choice between gold and paper as one involving
choosing between trust in politicians and trust in gold. Hopefully as reasonably stable and
moderately honest administrations grow, the possibilities for symbolic currency grow along with
them. As the nation sates become willing to surrender parts of their political power to international
bodies the possibilities for regional and then a fully international currency grow.
We live in an imperfect world with politicians, social pressure groups and economic entrepreneurs
all engaged in forms of trading and arbitrage in parts of the socio-political economic structure
replete with complex externalities. A little careful analysis indicates that in spite of the loose
analogy and metaphorical references to “the market for votes “, no efficient market for votes exists
(Shubik and van der Heyden, 1978). Voting mechanisms are not markets. They were designed to
work specifically in area where markets do not work. In general, when voting systems are
considered game theoretically they are modeled as games whose core solution is empty thereby
ruling out the hope that an efficient price for votes can be found.
Weaving between political and socio-economic reality and the idealizations of normative economic
theory the message is clear. The concept of the perfect money is mathematically straightforward.
Unfortunately, it does not seem to have a good enough physical counterpart in the world as we
know it. Gold is about as close as we get, especially when we add specific physical properties to the
list. These are often left out in idealized studies. They include features such as fungibility,
durability, cognizability, and the feature that gold is non-tarnishing. Although heavy, gold is still an
item to utilize when skipping borders in a world with political turbulence. But the ideal money in a
stable society is an abstraction supported by law and custom and their acceptance and enforcement.
The natural institution for the support of a nationally-acceptable money is the government who is,
essentially, the only institution known to every adult functioning member of society. The higher is
its reputation, the better a chance it has to support a stable symbolic currency and a financial system
that is needed for the control of the economy.
14. SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS
This essay has been offered in the spirit of jigsaw puzzle solving. Markets and money are together a
deep social systemic phenomenon. The economic and financial institutions of all societies are
products of their time and place. Many different bits and pieces must be melded together before the
overall pattern emerges. There is no simple causality. The theme of finance is flexibility in order to
maintain effective control and its manifestation is in the ease in which it changes form.
At a high level of abstractions all economies have agents that include producers, consumers,
transactors and financiers. They are all imbedded in polities that have government, law, and
politicians. The agents have preferences, and ownership claims. Modern economies have legal
persons who are players, yet are not human, but are owned collectively by humans. The problems
posed by the governance and strategic control of the corporation remain with us to this day. Even
so, the economic aspects of individual and joint optimization, the basic concepts of information and
strategy can all be formulated at a high level of abstraction. The properties of the “unrealistic
models “ constructed require high levels of analysis whether they are Edgeworth’s (1881) or Nash’s
(1953) formulation of bargaining; Shapley’s formulation of the core and value; Arrow and
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Debreu’s (1952) or von Neumann’s (1937) price governed economy, or Ramsey’s (1928) infinite
horizon model of saving.
The need to run the economy of here and now requires a deep individual and comparative
understanding of the institutions of today. The understanding of the invariant properties of an
economic system is of considerable service in framing the right analysis of the basic functions of
any institution. The two are complementary but require completely different skills and world views.
Perhaps one of the more perceptive exemplars of clash between abstraction and institutional and
historical understanding was presented in Herman Hesse’s Magister Ludi. The masters of an
abstract game retreated further and further from the world around them requiring more and more
intellect and technique and less and less sensory awareness of the world in which their cage of
abstraction was embedded.
In the understanding of a useful theory of money and financial institutions, the need is not to
choose between the richness of institutions and the elegance of mathematical and logical
abstractions; but to choose both. This requires adjusting each to the other. Furthermore, the clash
between institutional and mathematical studies in economics presents a false dichotomy furthered
by the emphasis on equilibrium studies. Equilibrium analysis can often be utilized to present a false
view of generality. Equilibrium studies can be formulated with abstractions that remove almost all
traces of institutions. The institutions are carriers of process and the carriers of process can only be
ignored in a search for existence proofs of points of equilibrium.
The approach adopted here is resolutely process oriented. In any attempt to model economic
activity as a game in extensive form institutions appear implicitly as part of the rules of the game.
Furthermore, it is possible to define and analyze minimal institutions. The concept of a minimal
institution together with being able to define structures that require the most and least amounts of
money required by organizations enables us to see how the financial control mechanism of an
economy fits over the economy as a whole. The simplified upper and lower bounds can be analyzed
and both are consistent with the overall equilibrium properties of the competitive price system. The
complexities of economic reality, however, lie in between and any appreciation of the dynamics of
these institutions calls for detailed knowledge of the institutions and their societies modified by the
application of the analytical results obtained from the parsimonious abstractions of economic
theory.
15. REPRISE
The ideal money is a perfect substitute for trust.
The general equilibrium system of Walras and his successors was a great feat of abstraction, but in
its progressive refinements and abstraction it emerged as a timeless pre-institutional representation
of the economic world that did not even need to include money and financial institutions in its
structure.
Any attempt to turn this structure into a playable game calls for carriers of process; but the carriers
of process are the institutions of the economy.
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Among the myriads of models available, it is possible to select minimally complex institutions that
require, as a lower bound no money whatsoever, and a model that requires the maximum money
that calls for the monetization of all nonmonetary wealth each period.
The lower and upper bounding models can be mathematized and analyzed at a high level of
abstraction. If there is (as can be defined precisely) enough money available and appropriately
distributed the upper bounding model will give the same static equilibrium economic production
and consumption results as the lower bounding model when there are many agents in the economy.
Economic reality lies between these bounds and even a casual attempt to model the more complex
process calls for institutional detail. This detail, no matter how complex, is reflected in the cash
flow conditions. The degree to which the cash flow conditions act as constraints is determined by
the monetary and credit institutions of each society.
In a stationary equilibrium the shadow prices of the constraints are zero and trade is ideally,
costlessly financed by either money or credit (the mix depending on a blend of reputation,
information and trust in the economy under consideration). In fact, costs are non-trivial and the
levels of trust and enforcement call for difficult ad hoc evaluations.
The strategic market game models and the associated modified market game models provide two
ways to attach the web of money and financial institutions to the essentially non-monetary general
equilibrium model.
The concept of “enough money, well-distributed” is a mathematical abstraction that both links sidepayment and NSP cooperative market games and provides the zero shadow price conditions on the
cash-flow constraints in the noncooperative strategic market games.
Except for the bounding extreme abstraction of the “sell-all” strategic market game the actuality of
enough money is determined by the institutional structure of the economy.
The presence of the monetary and financial system in the economy in stationary equilibrium is
hardly discernable.
In disequilibrium the financial system appears as the control mechanism for the society. The agents
who control the money and credit structure may influence those constraints that are either slack or
have positive shadow prices.
The decision to change the intensity of the constraints lies heavily with the lenders and their
judgment of risk. The twin roles of the lenders are as risk evaluators and financial resource
allocators.
Finance is strategic. The methods of game theory provide the appropriate structure and precision to
go beyond general equilibrium in providing complete process models.
The complete process models set up the conditions needed for the next stages in the development of
finance. They are institutional, behavioral and analytical. The institutions are reflected in the rules
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of the game; the behavioral assumptions are reflected in the solution concepts considered. Both of
these require empirical inputs. They are needed to justify not only the assumptions about structure
but where the distributions of uncertainty and behavioral predictions come from prior to analysis.
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